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NOTES

It is submitted that any ultimate solution to this and similar
problems must come from the legislature. Perhaps a rule similar to Federal Rule 57, which permits expeditious hearings in
suits for declaratory relief upon motion of one party, should be
enacted 5 Commentators have suggested other, more comprehensive remedial procedures.40 It is submitted that until such
a fundamental legislative change occurs, the judiciary must
balance the equities in the individual situations with which they
are confronted. In so doing the courts should be cognizant of
the potential for procedural abuse inherent in such situations
and act within permissible limits to preclude improprieties.
Burt K. Carnahan
INSURANCE: THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE AND
SECOND PERMITTEES

Randy Carroll had an automobile which he bought and
maintained with his own funds, but which was registered under
the name of his stepfather and insured under his stepfather's
policy. Randy let a friend borrow the car to go on a double date;
the friend loaned the car to the boy with whom he was double
dating, who wrecked the car through his own negligence. Randy
and the second permittee did not know each other. When the
owner and the collision insurer of the other vehicle involved in
the accident sued the second permittee and his father, they impleaded the liability insurer of the car and their own liability
insurer. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held, since the second
permittee did not have the permission of the named insured,
neither insurance company was liable.' American Home Assurance Co. v. Czarniecki, 255 La. 251, 230 So.2d 253 (1969).
Czarniecki presents the problem of the application of the om39. FED. R. Civ. P. 57 provides in part: "The court may order a speedy
hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and may advance it on the
calendar. .. ." This would not necessitate the furnishing of security as
required by LA. CODs Civ. P. art. 3610.
40. See 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVu LAW TREATIS § 2401 (1958), in which
the author advocates a speedy review system for administrative decisions.
1. Neither insurer was found liable for the collision itself; however, State
Farm was held liable for attorney's fees because of its duty to defend. The
Issue of an insurer's duty to defend is not discussed in this casenote. Also,
the court found Randy to be in the position of the named insured although
his stepfather was the policyholder. The court spent little time on this point
and so must have been satisfied that there was no fraud. The issue of who
is the named insured is not discussed in this casenote.
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nibus clause to the coverage of people whom the first permittee
has allowed to drive. 2 When the named insured has given the
first permittee express permission to let other specific people
drive, no problem exists. 3 The difficulty arises in determining

when the named insured has given his implied permission to the
first permittee to allow others to drive. 4
The courts have utilized various theories in finding an implied permission. In some cases they found the named insured's
granting general discretion and control to the first permittee
included an implied permission to allow others to drive. 5 In
others, the fact that the car was being used for the benefit of the
first permittee led to a finding of implied permission. Similarly,
the fact that the first permittee was in the car and in control
at the time of the accident was held to provide coverage. 7 One
2. See Comment, 22 LA. L. REv. 626, 632 (1962) for a good discussion of
this subject. The omnibus clause of the State Farm policy provides: "Persons insured. The following are insured under Part I: (A) With respect to
the owned automobile, (1) the named insured and any resident of the same
household, (2) any other person using such automobile with the permission
of the named insured, provided his actual operation or (if he is not operating) his other use thereof if within the scope of such permission, and . ....
American Home Assurance Co. v. Czarniecki, 255 La. 251, 260, 230 So.2d 253,
257 (1969). A reading of this clause plainly shows that the use of the automobile must be with the permission of the named insured for there to be
coverage under the policy. The problem here is to determine if the named
insured has given his permission for the first permittee to let others use
the car.
S. Normand v. Hertz Corp., 254 La. 1075, 229 So.2d 104 (1969). In this
case a man had rented a car from the defendant. The rental agreement
listed several people whom the customer could allow to drive. However,
there was no coverage because the man driving at the time of the wreck
was not one of these people.
4. The courts can determine the existence of express permission by looking for some objective, positive wording. However, the question of implied
permission involves a subjective examination of the facts. "Needless to say,
neither Jesse Waters nor Randy Carroll gave Charley any express permission, and the law cannot, on the basis of this record, imply that Charley had
permission . . ." American Home Assurance Co. v. Czarniecki, 255 La.
251, 266, 230 So.2d 253, 258 (1969).
5. Boston Ins. Co. v. Pendarvis, 195 So.2d 692 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967);
Peterson v.'Armstrong, 176 So.2d 453 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Buckelew v.
Roy, 168 So.2d 831 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Touchet v. Firemen's Ins. Co.,
159 So.2d 753 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); Hurdle v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co., 235 So.2d 63 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961); Garland v. Audubon Ins. Co., 119
So.2d 530 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960); Brooks v. Delta Fire & Cas. Co., 82 So.2d
55 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955); Boudreaux v. Cagle Motors, 70 So.2d 741 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1954); Perrodin v. Thibodeaux, 191 So. 148 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1939).
6. Thomas v. Peerless Ins. Co., 121 So.2d 593 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960);
Garland v. Audubon Ins. Co., 119 So.2d 530 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960); Brooks v.
Delta Fire & Cas. Co., 82 So.2d 55 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955); Boudreaux v.
Cagle Motors, 70 So.2d 741 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954).
7. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Gulf Nat'l Bank, 307 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1962);
Brooks v. Delta Fire & Cas. Co., 82 So.2d 55 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955). How-
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case held that the use of the vehicle for the purpose granted
gave coverage to a third person accomplishing this purpose.'
Finally, implied permission was found where the named insured's prohibition against the first permittee's allowing others
to drive had been knowingly violated in the past. 9
In determining a lack of implied permission, the courts
have most often found that specific instructions, written or
verbal, were given to the first permittee not to allow anyone
else to drive the car.10 Of course, as mentioned above, there
might be a finding of implied permission if in the past these
instructions had been knowingly violated." In other cases the
grant of permission for a specific purpose was held to negate
implied permission to let others drive.12
Rogillio v. Cazedessus8 was the first case in which the
Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled on the question of second
permittees. In that case a boy borrowed his father's car for the
night and left it at a friend's house while he accompanied the
latter on a trip. As he and the friend left, the boy left the keys
with the friend's younger brother so that the car could be moved
out of the driveway if necessary. The friend's younger brother,
not licensed to drive, took the car into town and wrecked it.
The liability insurer of the car was held not liable because
the friend's younger brother was driving without the permission
of the named insured. The court stated that under the policy
only the named insured or his spouse could grant permission.
The named insured gave no express permission, and allowing
ever, the courts did not rely solely on the fact that the first permittee was
in the car at the time of the wreck.
8. Donovan v. Standard Oil Co., 197 So. 820 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940).
9. Krupp v. Pan Air Corp., 183 So.2d 403 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Thomas
v. Peerless Ins. Co., 121 So.2d 593 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960).
10. Normand v. Hertz Corp., 254 La. 1075, 229 So.2d 104 (1969); Colston v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 210 So.2d 152 (La App. 3d Cir. 1968); Comeaux v. Miller, 195 So.2d 168 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Taylor v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
191 So.2d 786 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966). Smith v. Insurance Co., 161 So.2d 903
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1964); Jones v. Indiana Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 161
So.2d 445 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Coco v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
136 So.2d 288 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961); Clemons v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co.,
18 So.2d 228 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944).
11. See cases cited note 9 supra.
12. Raymond v. Indiana Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 295 F.2d 188 (5th
Cir. 1961); Scoggins v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 161 So.2d 438 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1964); Anderson v. Adams, 148 So.2d 347 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962); Parker
v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 81 So.2d 79 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955); Longwell v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 63 So.2d 440 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953).
13. 241 La. 186, 127 So.2d 734 (1961).
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the son to use the car did not include an implied permission
to let others drive. There was testimony that the son had been
instructed not to let other children drive the car, but the extent
to which this consideration controlled the decision is not clear.
Two appellate court cases involving situations similar to
the instant case are Touchet v. Firemen's Insurance Co. of
4 and Buckelew v.
Newark, New JerseyM
Roy.15 In Touchet the
named insured gave his son permission to use his car for an
evening of entertainment. A friend, who accompanied the son,
was present when permission was given. Later in the night the
son let his friend drive. When the friend wrecked the car, the
court held that the initial permission to the son gave him such
general discretion that it included the implied permission to let
the friend drive.
In Buckelew the named insured gave his son permission to
use the car for the night, knowing that two friends were triple
dating with his son. The three went to pick up the son's date;
since she was not ready, the son let the two friends go pick
up their dates. While on this trip, one of the friends wrecked the
car. In finding coverage, the court relied on the Touchet decision. The initial permission granted to the son gave him such
general discretion that it included implied permission for the
friends to drive.
In the instant case the court treated Randy as the named
insured because of the unrestricted, broad authority he had to
use the car. In determining whether the second permittee had
Randy's implied permission, the court used the test of what was
reasonably foreseeable to Randy. It found that Randy did not
know the second permittee, had never allowed the first permittee
to drive before, and had no reason to foresee that the first permittee would lend the car to someone Randy did not know. It
also observed that the record did not establish that it was a
custom of young people to lend their cars to one another when
double dating. Based on these findings, the court decided that it
was not reasonably foreseeable that the first permittee would
lend the car to the second permittee. Since the latter was driv14. 159 So.2d 753 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
15. 168 So.2d 831 (La. App. 2d Mr. 1964).
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ing without the permission of the named insured, he could not
be considered an omnibus insured."6
Upon first reading it might seem that this case departs from
certain prior Louisiana appellate decisions. In Touchet and Buckelew the court, based on the absence of restriction and the
general nature of the permission granted to the initial user,
found that the named insured had given implied permission for
others to drive. The court in the instant case found general
permission from the named insured to the first permittee;" it
might thus appear that there should be coverage.
However, it is submitted that the case does not deviate
from past jurisprudence, but rather presents a clearer and
simpler test to determine the question of implied permission.
First, the Touchet case is perhaps on the outer limits of the
general permission theory.' 8 Of all cases its reasoning is the
most consistent with Justice Sanders' concurring opinion in
Rogillio.19 The thrust of Sanders' opinion is that where no restriction is imposed on the initial permittee he has implied
permission to permit others to drive-i.e., a change in drivers
is treated in the same manner as a deviation in route and coverage is not defeated.2 0 But the majority opinion in Rogillio illustrates clearly that the supreme court was unwilling to go this
far.2 1 While the use of the car in Rogillio was more restricted
than in Touchet, the supreme court still evidenced its dis16. In American Home Assurance Co. v. Czarniecki, 255 La. 251, 267, 230
So.2d 253, 258-59 (1969), the supreme court said that Aetna was not liable
either, because Charley could not reasonably believe he was driving the

car with the permission of the named insured. In Rogillio v. Cazedessus,
241 La. 186, 127 So.2d, 734 (1961) the supreme court found the liability insurer
of the boy who drove without permission of the named insured liable. The
change in decisions reflects the change in the wording of the omnibus clause.
The clause now extends coverage only If ". . . actual use thereof is with
the permission, or reasonably believed to be with the permission, of the
owner ....
." (Court's emphasis.) American Home Assurance Co. v. Czarniecki, 255 La. 251, 267, 230 So.2d 253, 259 (1969).
17. American Home Assurance Co. v. Czarnlecki, 255 La. 251, 264, 230
So.2d 253, 257 (1969).
18. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964 TermInsurance, 25 LA. L. Rsv. 381, 382 (1965).
19. Rogillio v. Cazedessus, 241 La. 186, 200, 127 So.2d 734, 739 (1961).
For discussion of this case, see text at note 13 supra.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 196, 127 So.2d at 737. "But counsel for said companies confidently declare that in other cases we have, either expressly or by denying
writs to the Courts of Appeal, so extended the interpretation of 'permission
of the named insured' that it applies to anyone who has been given legal
control of the car. With this we cannot agree."
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approval of a theory in which lawful possession by the second
permittee would automatically mean permission of the named
insured.22
Secondly, the instant case can be distinguished factually
from both Touchet and Buckelew. In both of these earlier cases
the named insured knew the identity of the person who later
drove. Here the named insured knew only that some unknown
third person was double dating with the first permittee. In addition, the named insured had never before loaned his car to
the first permittee. Thus, there was nothing to support a finding
that the initial permittee had authority to lend the car to another,
with the possible exception that the car was to be used on a
double date.23 The court was unwilling to go this far. It may
be significant that the supreme court discussed neither Touchet
nor Buckelew. Nonetheless, the fact that the owner did not even
know the second permittee supports the belief that the owner did
not anticipate that the car would be loaned to the second permittee by the omnibus insured or that the latter might assume
authority to do so.
While this case is the first to utilize reasonable foreseeability as the test for determining the extent of the implied
permission of the named insured, other cases have mentioned
reasonable foreseeability as a factor.24 It is submitted that this is
the clearest and simplest test to apply. Items examined in the
past by the courts to determine the scope of the implied permission-such as, the nature of the permission, the restriction,
the presence of first permittees, the benefit of first permittees,
and others-are actually only elements of what is reasonably
foreseeable. Other factors such as past use and deviation should
be examined. By combining these elements, the test of reasonable
foreseeability provides a single and a most sensible test. If the
named insured could have reasonably foreseen the possibility
of the first permittee allowing another to drive and yet said
22. Id.
23. It is Interesting to note that Justice Sanders in his dissent stated

he felt the car's being used on a double date was enough to support a finding that the use by the second permittee was reasonably foreseeable. "Since
Randy had full knowledge that the car was to be used on a double date,
at least until midnight, it was entirely foreseeable that the other boy with
Hans might drive the car." (Court's emphasis.) American Home Assurance
Co. v. Czarniecki, 255 La. 251, 272, 230 So.2d 253, 260 (1969).
24. Rogillio v. Cazedessus, 241 La. 186, 197, 127 So.2d 734, 738 (1961);
Brooks v. Delta Fire & Cas. Co., 82 So.2d 55, 58 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
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nothing, he has certainly given his implied permission for the
other to drive. However, if the named insured could not reasonably foresee this action by the first permittee, it certainly is a
fiction to say he gave his implied permission to let another drive.
Edwin K. Theus, Jr.

